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Insider Liability for Short-Swing Profits: The Substance
and Function of the Pragmatic Approach
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 seeks to deter short-s'lving stock speculation by corporate insiders who have advance knowledge of a change in the value of their issuer's securities.11
"Insiders"--officers, directors, and beneficial owners of more than ten
per cent of the stock of a corporation3-may be divested of profits
I. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970):
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired m
good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial
owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security
purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six
months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any
court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the
is/;uer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to
bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute
the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two rears after
the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover
any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the
purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any trans•
action or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt
as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.
2. See, e.g., Kem County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 591·
92 (1973); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., Ul6 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 820 U.S.
751 (1943); Cook &: Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange A.ct (pt. 1),
66 HARv. L. REv. 385, 386 (1953).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970): "Every person
who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any
class of equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant
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made from a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of their issuer's
stock where both the purchase and sale have occurred ,;'vi.thin a six.month period. On its face, section 16(b) is easy to apply: Consideration of the insider's intent to speculate is explicitly barred, and proof
of actual abuse of inside information has been uniformly held to be
irrelevant.4
However, there has been an increasing realization that some instances of insider trading, although they apparently fall within the
strict terms of the statute, should not be subject to the "crushing
liabilities"5 that the statute imposes. Increased flexibility in applying
section 16(b) has, so far, centered around the treatment of "unorthodox" transactions 6-noncash transactions such as stock conversions,
the grant or exercise of stock options, and stock exchanges pursuant
to mergers, which do not clearly fall within the statutory definitions
of "purchase" and "sale." 7 Early cases, using a so-called "objective approach,"8 dealt with unorthodox transactions in a mechanical fashion,
without considering the circumstances surrounding the particular
transaction in light of the statutory purpose.9
to section 78l of this title, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security" is ·an insider. The section referred to in the quoted portion of section 16(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78l (1970), sets forth certain registration requirements for issuers with total
assets exceeding 1 million dollars and a class of equity securities held of record by 500
or more persons. Both large over-the-counter companies and companies with securities
traded on a national exchange are included.
4. See, e.g., Kem County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 595
(1973); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 425 (1972); Blau v. Lamb,
363 F.2d 507, 516 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Blau v. Max Factor
&: Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307 n.6 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); B.T. Babbitt,
Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1964); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 344
(6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d
231, 235-86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
5. See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
6. The term " 'unorthodox' transactions" is perhaps attributable to 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES R.EcuLAnoN 1069 (2d ed. 1961), and is an accepted part of the section 16(b) vocabulary. See Kem County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593 n.24
(1973).
7. Section 3 of the Exchange Act provides that, "unless the context otherwise requires," the term " 'purchase' ••• include[s] any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise
acquire," 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1970), and the term "'sell' •.. include[s] any contract to
sell or othenvise dispose of.'' 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l4) (1970).
8. The terms "objective," "subjective," and "pragmatic" are also part of a well-accepted nomenclature for various approaches to the application of section 16(b). See
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594 n.26 (1973);
Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, 343 (4th,Cir. 1973); Comment, Stock Exchange Pursuant to
Corporate Consolidation: A Section 16(b) "Purchase or Sale"?, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1034,
1036-39 (1969).
9. Typical of the objective approach is the following language of Judge Clark in
Park &: Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947),
where the court held that a conversion of certain preferred stock into common stock was
a section 16(b) purchase: "Defendants did not own the common stock in question before
they exercised their option to convert; they did afterward. Therefore they acquired the
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More recently, a second, "pragmatic," approach has been developed, which inquires "whether the transaction may serve as a vehicle for the evil which Congress sought to prevent."10 Therefore, the
possibility of abuse of inside information, drawn from the circumstances surrounding the defendant's transactions, is the test for liability.11 The existence of possibility of abuse is determined, for instance,
by asking whether the defendant had access to inside information,12
whether the information was adequately disclosed,13 or whether the
transaction was simply a continuation of a prior investment.14
In Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 10 the
Supreme Court adopted a form of the pragmatic approach. In determining whether certain transactions constituted "sales" within the
meaning of section 16(b), the Court looked to whether they had potential for speculative abuse. 16 However, the Court's discussion leaves
stock, within the meaning of the Act." 160 F.2d at 987. Accord, Heli-Coil Corp. v. Web•
ster, 352 F.2d 156 {3d Cir. 1965); Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
411 U.S. 582, 605 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir,
1966) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
10. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594 (1973)
(emphasis added).
11. Among the many cases applying the "pragmatic" approach arc Gold v. Sloan,
486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973); Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir,),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert,
denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1002 (1967); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
892 (1965); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927
(1959); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954); Amcri•
can Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
12. See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 598•
600 (1973).
13. See, e.g., Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, 349 (4th Cir. 1973).
14. See, e.g., Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 522 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1002 (1967).
15. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
16. Kern County involved a tender-offerer (Occidental) that was trapped into an exchange of securities by a defensive merger on the part of the target corporation (Old
Kern). The situation was complicated by an option agreement between Occidental and
Tenneco, Inc., the company which finally acquired Old Kern, by which Tenneco received an option on all of the Tenneco stock that Occidental would receive in exchange
for its Old Kern shares upon consummation of the Old Kern-Tenneco merger. Occidcntal's liability under section 16(b) was asserted on two theories: (I) Occidental had purchased more than ten per cent of Old Kern's stock pursuant to its tencler offer, making
it a "beneficial owner'' within the terms of the statute (see note 3 supra) and had fol•
lowed the purchase with a "sale" within six months when it became irrevocably entitled
to exchange its Old Kern stock for Tenneco stock pursuant to the terms of the Old
Kern-Tenneco defensive merger; (2) Occidental had "sold" within six months of its purchase when it granted an option on its Tenneco shares, even though the option by its
terms could not be exercised until at least six months after the date that Occidental be•
came an "insider" by acquiring more than ten per cent of Old Kern's stock. 411 U.S. at
595-96.
The majority of the Court CTustices Douglas, Stewart, and Brennan dissented) re•
jected both theories on the ground that neither alleged "sale" could have been used as
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the substantive requirements of the test unclear, and its use of the test
for the narrow purpose of deciding whether a transaction is a "purchase" or "sale" raises serious questions.
This Note will discuss the inquiries encompassed by the "possibility of abuse" test. It will also evaluate whether the test is properly employed only in determining that an unorthodox transaction is or is
not a "purchase" or "sale" or whether the test could better be used as
a threshold inquiry in all cases.
As a preliminary matter, no abuse is possible if the form of the defendant's transactions provides no opportunity for the use of inside
information.17 In other words, the defendant's "purchase" and "sale"
must both represent a discontinuity of investment-the purchase
must create a new opportunity for profit, and the sale must allow a
realization of that profit if a possibility of abuse is to be found.18
To illustrate, suppose Bishop, a director of Chess Corporation,
purchases 1,000 shares of Chess convertible preferred stock on January 2. On May I, Bishop converts the preferred stock into common
because Chess has called the preferred stock at a price below market.19
The price of both preferred and common Chess stock has risen bea vehicle for speculative abuse; hence, neither transaction was a "sale." With respect to
Occidental's acquisition of the right to exchange its Old Kern shares the Court argued
that Occidental had no inside information before its tender offer since it was not yet an
insider. Furthermore, Occidental could have gained no inside information ~ven after it
became a beneficial owner of over ten per cent, because the Old Kern management was
its antagonist, rather than its confidant. 411 U.S. at 596-99. A "critical fact" was the involuntary nature of the merger, so far as Occidental was concerned, since Occidental
had neither control of nor participation in the transaction. 411 U.S. at 599-600. With
respect to the option agreement, the Col.lrt emphasized, first, that the alleged "sale"
was to the new owners of Old Kern, who undoubtedly had more information about Old
Kern than did Occidental. 411 U.S. at 602. Second, the option granted was a "call"
rather than a "put." If the price of the optioned stock fell more than ten dollars per
share Tenneco could fail to exercise the option and the shares would remain with Occidental. If the price rose Tenneco would buy the shares at the option price, and Occidental would have made an unfavorable bargain. 411 U.S. at 602. Third, the option
covered not Old Kern stock but the Tenneco preference stock to which Occidental became entitled pursuant to the merger. Even if Occidental did have inside informa. tion about Old Kem it had no inside information as to the future value of its prospective Tenneco holdings. 411 U.S. at 602-03. Fourth, no inside information would have
been useful in any case since the option could not be exercised for at least six months,
a period that the statute presumes long enough to dissipate the usefulness of inside information. 411 U.S. at 603. Finally, the premium paid for the option was reasonable in
light of expert evaluations of the option's worth and was not large enough to make
exercise of the option a virtual certainty. Nor was the giving of the option accompanied
by the surrender of voting rights or the passing of other emoluments of ownership that
would indicate that the option was in fact a sale in disguise. 411 U.S. at 603-04.
17. See Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 521 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967).
18. This formulation is valid where an investor's purchase is matched with a later
sale. In sale-purchase situations, on the other hand, it is the sale that creates the opportunity for profit and the purchase that completes the realization.
19. See, e.g., Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
927 (1959).
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tween January 2 and May I because of technological discoveries announced by Chess on January 15 but knmvn to Chess directors before
January 2. Should Bishop' be liable for short-swing profits on the
theory that his conversion was a "sale" for purposes of section 16(b)?20
The answer should depend on whether Bishop's conversion was a
simple continuation of his former investment. If Bishop had sold for
cash rather than converting his stock he clearly would have made a
sale because his assets would no longer be subject to an investment
risk. If, when Bishop converted, the prices of Chess common and preferred stock were completely interdependent, his holdings before and
after the conversion would be "economic equivalents"; 21 his situation
would be the same as if he bought Chess preferred stock on January
2 and simply retained it for more than six months.22 If the price of
common and preferred stock did vary independently,23 however,
Bishop would have significantly changed his investment, and his conversion should be regarded as a sale.24 Logically, this analysis should
also extend to exchanges of stock pursuant to merger. Where an in•
vestor trades stock in corporation A for stock in corporation B he has
usually made a "sale" of A stock and a "purchase" of B stock because
his investment will have changed substantially. Where A and B are
essentially the same corporation in different forms, however, the investor should face no liability. The Securities and Exchange Commission has codified this analysis by exempting from section 16(b)
"acquisitions and dispositions of securities pursuant to mergers or
consolidations" where the acquiring company owned eighty-five per
cent of the securities or assets of the acquired company prior to the
merger. 25
If the "possibility of abuse" test is used solely to determine
whether a given unorthodox transaction is a "purchase" or "sale,"
this limited inquiry into continuity of investment may be sufficient.
20. The answer would be "no" under 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9 (1973), an exemption for
certain conversions established by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1966. The
rule will be ignored for the purposes of this hypothetical.
21. See Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 522 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927
(1959).
22. In such a case, of course, section 16(b) would not apply. The defendant is not
exonerated because he did not purchase on the basis of inside information; Bishop may,
indeed, have purchased with Chess' discoveries in mind. The point is that the statute
does not punish purchases that are not followed by sales within six months, partly be,
cause the draftsmen did not want to discourage long-term investment and partly because
they assumed that, if an investor waits for six months before selling, any information he
may have will have outlived its usefulness. See text accompanying note 46 infra.
23. See, e.g., Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
1016 (1954). Cf. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 927 (1959).
24. See, e.g., Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 927 (1959).
25. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16b-7(a)(l) to (4) (1973).

•
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However, in a broader sense, the "possibility of abuse" test could be
used-in cases involving orthodox, as well as those involving unorthodox transactions-to determine whether it is appropriate to
subject the defendant to liability under section 16(b) at all. When
it is used in this sense, the test properly encompasses inquiries beyond
mere continuity of investment.
In defining what is meant by "possibility of abuse" in a broader
sense, however, orie must first examine the nature of the "abuse" that
Congress sought to reach by enacting section 16(b).26
26. One important issue must be resolved first. It is characteristic of the amorphous
state of the "possibility of abuse" test that the word "possibility" has more than one
interpretation. It may mean that courts should examine the defendant's transactions
and decide whether there is a possibility that the defendant actually did trade on the
basis of inside information. On the other hand, "possibility" may be used in the sense
of "opportunity," allowing courts to inquire whether someone in the defendant's position could have taken advantage of inside information, even though it may be clear
that the defendant himself did not. In most cases either formulation will lead to the
same result. Where the defendant could have had no inside information before his
initial purchase or sale there is no chance that he actually traded on inside information,
and there was never any opportunity for him to do so. See, e.g., Kem County Land Co.
v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973), discussed in note 16 supra. Suppose,
however, that insider X received information on June I about an important event to
occur on July I that will raise the price of his issuer's stock. He keeps the information
secret until June 15, when it is disclosed in a proxy statement. He buys on June 20
and sells on July 31, still turning a profit because the market was slow to realize the
significance of the disclosure. Is there a possibility of abuse? Certainly when X made
his purchase, the information that led him to do so was not "inside" information, but
X did have an opportunity to trade on advance knowledge between June I and June 15.
The Fourth Circuit, on analogous facts, recently found a possibility of abuse in Gold
v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (1973). A director of Atlantic Research Corporation (ARC), Arthur
Sloan, gained access to the books, records, and physical plant of Susquehanna Corporation prior to Susquehanna's merger with ARC. The court found that Sloan had thus
acquired "specific financial information .•• that would have helped him to predict the
future performance of Susquehanna stock." 486 F.2d at 352. The court acknowledged,
however, that Sloan's information was distributed to all ARC shareholders in a proxy
statement of October 26, 1967, relating to the proposed merger. Sloan made no purchase
of ARC or of Susquehanna stock until the merger was closed on December 4, 1967, when
some ARC stock that he had acquired years earlier was exchanged for Susquehanna stock
pursuant to the merger agreement. Within six months of this exchange, he sold some
of the Susquehanna stock for cash. While Sloan did have the opportunity to speculate
prior to October 26, he did not do so, and there was no showing that his "purchase" in
December was based on any information that had not been made public over a month
before. Nevertheless, the court held that "[d]uring this . • . period [that is, before
October 26], when stockholders generally were uninformed about Susquehanna and its
financial condition and prospects, Sloan was in possession of information secured by an
examination of Susquehanna's records and inspection of its plants that gave him superior
knowledge about the financial condition of Susquehanna and its prospects. He thus did
have an opportunity for abuse of inside information." 486 F.2d at 352. In such situations
it is more consistent with the purpose of the statute and the goal of avoiding harshness
to find no "possibility of abuse," provided that the insider has allowed outsiders a reasonable time to "absorb and evaluate disclosures" before purchasing himself. Cf. SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 n.18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1968). Furthermore, it is hard to reconcile the meaning of "possibility of abuse" as used
in Gold with the test as it is set forth by Kern County and other cases using the "pragmatic" approach. See, e.g., Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 521 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1002 (1967): "As controlling insiders [the defendants] clearly had the power to
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Superficially, the evils that led to the enactment of section 16(b)
are plain. The subsection declares its purpose to be "preventing the
unfair use of information which may have been obtained by [a corporate insider] by reason of his relationship to the issuer,"27 and an
early case states that"§ 16(b), specifically, was designed to protect the
'outside' stockholders against at least short-swing speculation by insiders with advance information."28 The congressional committees
that recommended the enactment of section 16(b) emphasized the
situation in which an insider would learn about, or even plan to
create, a future price rise in his issu~r's stock, purchase while the price
was still low, and sell later to reap a virtually certain profit.20 This
sort of abuse is clearly encompassed by the statute. Its key feature is
that the investor has inside information before he makes his initial
purchase or sale; he is motivated to begin his short-swing by advance knowledge. This situation may be termed "double-transaction
abuse," because the advance information has influenced both the insider's first transaction-where the opportunity for profit is createdand his second transaction-where the profit is realized. A different
situation is presented by the investor who makes his purchase with no
specific information about future price changes, but who receives
such information before his sale. The inside information may still be
exploited. The purchaser may, for instance, temporarily refrain from
selling his stock after learning about an impending rise in its price.
The advance information, however, influences only a single transacmisuse inside information for speculative purposes. But the question remains: Did the
conversion present (them] with even the slightest opportunity to exercise that power?"
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
28. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943). Similar statements abound in almost every case dealing with section 16(b).
See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 592-93
(1973); Reliance. Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404: U.S. 418, 422 (1972); Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844-47 (2d Cir. 1959).
29. See, e.g., SEN. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934):
The bill ••• aims to protect the interests of the public by preventing directors,
officers, and principal stockholders of a corporation ••• from speculating in the
stock on the basis of information not available to others •••• In a particularly
glaring instance, the chairman of the executive committee and another director
participated in a pool organized [to] trade in the stock of their company when the
stock was paying no dividends. During the operation of the pool, which continued
for a period of 2 years, they caused the company to resume the payment of dividends, more than 25 per cent of which were received by the pool participants.
These dividends were paid during the pool's operation in spite of the fact that
the company's earnings were not sufficient to meet them and part of its surplus
had to be diverted for that purpose. In another case, the president of a corporation
testified that he and his brothers controlled the company with a little over 10 per
cent of the shares; that shortly before the company passed a dividend, they disposed of their holdings for upward of $16,000,000 and later repurchased them for
about $7,000,000 showing a profit of approximately $9,000,000 on the transaction.
Many other instances were developed before the committee where insiders • • •
participated largely in profits derived from the use of information not procurable by the investing public.
See also SEN. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934).
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tion-the final sale-and, therefore, the situation involves at the most
only "single-transactio?- abuse."
It is not entirely clear that section 16(b) reaches single-, as well as
double-, transaction abuses. The following hypothetical case demon.strates a situation in which the investor will be subject to section
16(b) liability only if the statute's reach extends to both types of
abuse. Assume investor Pawn purchases one hundred shares of the
stock of Chess Corporation for thirty dollars a share on January I.
This purchase does not make Pawn an insider, but he becomes one
on April 1 when he is named to the Chess board of directors. On
April 15, Pawn receive~ information that Chess ·will merge with
Checkers Corporation during the last few weeks of June. This information is not made public until May 1, and the merger is closed
as planned on June 25; Pawn thereby becomes a holder of one hundred shares in the surviving company (Games), who~e shares have a
market value of sixty dollars. Pawn has made a substantial profit because the exchange rate was tied to the June 25 price of Chess stock,
which, as Pawn could have foreseen on April 15, was much higher
than the pre-announcement price. Games Corporation brings suit
against Pawn under section 16(b), alleging that he has made a profit
by buying and selling Chess stock within six months. The principle
issue is whether Pawn "sold" his Chess stock within the meaning of
the statute when it was transmuted into Games stock pursuant to the
merger.30 The test set forth in Kern County is whether Pawn's transactions reflect a possibility of abuse. If section 16(b) deals only with
double-transaction abuse the exchange should not be held to be a
"sale" for purposes of section 16(b); unless other facts are shown, it is
reasonable to as.sume that Pawn's initial purchase was entirely unrelated to the future price rise. 31 There is; in other words, no possibility
of double-transaction abuse. However, if section 16(b) also deals with
single-transaction abuse, the result would be different. Although
Pawn may otherwise have sold his stock between April 15 and May I,
his knowledge of the forthcoming merger may have led him to retain
the stock until after the merger was announced. To the extent Pawn
possessed inside information that enabled him to "time" his sale he
30. Pawn could claim that section 16(b) does not apply to him because he was not an
insider at the time he purchased. Such a claim, however, has been rejected in a number
of cases. See, e.g., Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Adler v. Klawans, 172 F. Supp. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), affd., 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir.
1959); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See also 2 L. Loss, supra note 6,
at 1060-61; w. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 39-40 (1969). This issue is discussed in the text accompanying notes 85-91 infra.
31. The result should, perhaps, be different if it could be established that Pawn was
the moving or controlling force behind the merger. It would then be not unlikely that
he knew at the time of his purchase that he would be able to engineer a merger that
would increase the price of his shares. See notes 88-89 infra and accompanying text.
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enjoyed an unfair advantage over other Chess shareholders, and thus
his exchange involves a possibility of single-transaction abuse.
No court has dealt explicitly with the distinction between singleand double-transaction abuse, but a comparison of several cases indicates that there is a good deal of confusion about the problem. Stella
v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.32 suggests that single-transaction abuse
may be irrelevant in the section 16(b) context. That case dealt with
an outsider that assumed insider status by purchasing stock sufficient
to make it a beneficial owner of over ten per cent of the issuer's outstanding stock. The purchase was followed within six months by a
sale, and suit was brought against the inve~tor under section 16(b).
The defendant claimed that, since it was not an insider prior to its
purchase, it was exempted under the statutory provision precluding
liability for "any transaction where such beneficial owner was not
such both at the time of the purchase and sale ... of the security involved."33 The district court noted that the phrase "at the time of"
could mean either "prior to" or "simultaneously with." It accepted
the latter interpretation and construed the statute to include the very
purchase that makes one an insider. Such a construction could be
easily supported if it is assumed that section 16(b) reaches singletransaction abuse. The fact that an investor was not an insider when
he made his initial purchase is irrelevant if a possibility of abuse in
the later sale-made after he became an insider and when he may
have had inside information allowing him to time his sale-is sufficient to bring him within the reach of the statute. The court was not
concerned, however, with the possibility of single-transaction abuse,
even though it was certainly present. Rather, the court emphasized
that the opposite result would allow an owner of over ten per cent of
the stock who wanted to act on advance information to avoid liability
by selling out to below ten per cent before making a short-swing purchase and sale.34 The court was disturbed by the opportunity for dou•
32. 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
33. 15 u.s.c. § 78p(b) (1970).
34. 104 F. Supp. at 959:
If the construction urged by defendant is placed upon the exemption provision,
it would be possible for a person to purchase a large block. of stock., sell it out until
his ownership was reduced to less than 10%, and then repeat the process, ad in•
finitum. A construction such as this would provide a way for the evasion of § 16(b)
by principal stockholders, and render it largely ineffective to prevent some of the
financial evils which led to the passage of this legislation by Congress.
In other words, a shareholder with over ten per cent could gain advance information about a price rise. Acting upon this information, he could sell out to below ten per
cent and shortly thereafter repurchase even more shares than be originally held. This
sale and purchase, though covered by section 16(b), would likely be inconsequential,
since the price of the stock would not yet have risen. It would rise shortly thereafter,
but the investor could sell and take his profit with impunity if the repurchase were exempt under section 16(b) because he was not an insider immediately prior to it. For a
further discussion of this situation, see text accompanying notes 92·106 infra.
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ble-transaction abuse left open by the defendant's argument; the opportunity for single-transaction abuse was ignored.35 Other cases, however, strongly suggest that single-transaction
abuse is reached by section 16(b). In Kern County the Supreme Court
found that the defendent's initial purchase was made without an opportunity to acquire inside information.36 If the Court had only been
willing to consider double-transaction abuse, its inquiry would have
stopped there. However, it went on to consider whether there was a
possibility of abuse in the defendant's alleged section 16(b) "sales"its grant of an option on shares that it would acquire pursuant to a
merger and the merger exchange itself. The Court eventually found
no possibility of abuse at any stage, but the very fact that an inquiry
was made into all three transactions indicates that the Court thought '
that the possibility of single-transaction abuse would have been sufficient to in;ipose liability. The Fourth Circuit, in Gold v. Sloan,31 dealt
more directly with single-transaction abuse. The opinion states that
the pragmatic approach "requires as a basis for statutory liability that
the specific transaction itself, which constitutes the unorthodox transaction, present the possibility of, or potential for, exploitation of
insider information."38 Finally, the Second Circuit, in Newmark v.
RKO General, Inc., 39 arriving at the same conclusion it had accepted
35. The opportunity for single-transaction abuse was e."<plicitly found to be outside
the statute's scope by Judge Hincks, who dissented from the Second Circuit's reversal
of a subsequent district court holding in Stella:
[I']he basic rationale of the Act was such that only completed swing transactions
gave rise to the presumption of unethical use of advance information: if one purchased stock on one day, became a director on the next, and sold some of his stock
on the next, any resulting profit was not recoverable by the corporation apparently
because a sale alone was thought to be insuffident basis for a drastic presumption
that it had been made in violation of a fiduciary duty.
Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299, 305 (1956), revg. on other grounds
132 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (emphasis added).
Judge Hincks' reasoning was followed in Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. W.R. Stephens Inv. Co., 141 F. Supp. 841, 847 (W.D. Ark. 1956). Contra, Emerson Elec. Co. v.
Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918, 922-24 (8th Cir. 1970), affd. on other grounds, 404 U.S.
418 (1972); Ne,\TIIlark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
854 (1970).
36. 411 U.S. at 596-97. For a summary of the facts and holding of the case, see note
16 supra.
37. 486 F.2d 340 (1973). The Gold case is discussed in note 26 supra.
38. 486 F.2d at 343 (emphasis original).
The dissenting judge in Gold is still more explicit. He notes cases that have held
a director liable for profits under section 16(b) even though he was not a director at ,
the time of his initial purchase and goes on to state that "[t]he application of § 16(b)
to such cases can be supported only on the theory that the possible use of inside information, acquired during the period between the defendant's service as a director and
his subsequent closing sales, in order to time those sales as advantageously as possible,
was one of the kinds of abuses Congress sought to prevent." 486 F.2d at 356 (Winter,
J., dissenting in part). Cf. Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689, 693 (2d Cir. 1957).
39. 425 F.2d 348, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
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earlier in Stella, based its discussion solely on the possibility of singletransaction abuse:
The statutory reference to a ten per cent beneficial owner rests on the
presumption that an mvner of this quantity of securities has access to
inside information. Although this presumption would not justify the
conclusion that one who purchases a quantity of shares which makes
him a ten per cent beneficial owner has done so on the basis of inside
information, the presumed access to such information resulting from
this purchase provides him with an opportunity, not available to the
investing public, to sell his shares at the moment most advantageous
to him. Thus, a purchase of shares which makes the buyer an insider
creates an opportunity for the type of speculative abuse the statute
was enacted to prevent.4 0

The cases suggest that single-transaction abuse should be included
within the scope of section 16(b), but, if they shed any light, they do
so only incidentally, for they neither distinguish the two forms of
abuse nor expressly reach the question of which form is included by
the statute.
A direct analysis of the problem must include the following inquiries: (1) Was section 16(b) intended by Congress to deal with single-transaction abuse? (2) Assuming arguendo that the legislative intent is in any way unclear, should the courts extend the section to
cover such abuse? The issue of legislative intent may be addressed by
examining the terms of the statute and its legislative history, both of
which indicate that only double-transaction abuse was intended to
be reached. The congressional hearings and reports discussing the
provision eventually enacted as section 16(b) repeatedly describe its
purpose in terms referring to double- rather than single-transaction
abuse-the curbing of "short-term," "in-and-out" speculation on the
basis of inside information.41 Furthermore, the examples in the con40. 425 F.2d at 356.
41. Section 16(b) "[f]orbids [the insider] to carry on any short-term specu[la]tions in
the stock. He cannot with his inside information get in and out of stock within six
months." Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce1 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1934) (statement of Thomas Corcoran),
Section 16(b) "is to prevent directors receiving the benefits of short-term speculative
swings on the securities of their own companies, because of inside information," Hear•
ings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56, and S. Res. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency; 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Thomas Corcoran).
Furthermore, many references to the evil that led to the enactment of section 16(b)
expressly speak of an intent to speculate at the time of the initial transaction. There
are, for instance, these passages from the deliberations over the inclusion of a "sale and
purchase" provision as well as a "purchase and sale" clause:
Senator BULKLEY. Do you provide for (the case) where a man might sell for a
short term with the intention of repurchasing? •••
It would not be selling short. He might be a large stockholder, and sell his own
stock with the intention of repurchasing.
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gressional hearings and reports of the kind of abuse intended to be
reached by section 16(b) include no instances of single-transaction
abuse, but in all cases describe situations in which advance information tainted both the purchase and the sale.42
The case from the statute itself is even more clear. First, the statute speaks in conjunctive terms of "profit realized ... from any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase ... ,"43 implying that Congress
did not intend section 16(b) to deter abuse of inside information in a
single transaction unless the abuse was converted into a trading profit
by means of a second transaction.44 This implication is supported by
Mr. CoRCORAN. The bill does not cover that case•••• Usually men are not as
ready to sell a stock with the expectation of picking it up on the downgrade as they
are to. buy a stock on what they think is going to be a rise in the market.
Senate Hearings, supra, at 6557-58 (emphasis added).
Some language in the congressional literature is broad enough to encompass singletransaction abuse. See, e.g., SEN. REP. No. 1455, supra note 29, at 68: "By this section it
is rendered unlawful for persons intrusted with the administration of corporate affairs
or vested with substantial control over corporations to use inside information for their
own advantage.'' However, this general language is also compatible with double-transaction abuse, and the weight of the evidence suggests that no implication of concern about
single-transaction abuse be drawn from it.
42. See SEN. REP. No. 1455, supra note 29, at 55-68. See also Reliance Elec. Co. v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418,429 n.3 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting):
Much of the insider abuse involved participation in so-called "pools," which
were dummy accounts in a corporation's stock established to buy and sell, at the
same time, and at a frenetic pace. By so churning the account, it was often possible to engineer a false impression of immense activity in the stock, and to arrange
spectacular, but artificial, price rises. One pool bought and sold almost 1,500,000
shares of RCA stock in a single seven-day period in 1939, at a net profit to its members of almost $5,000,000•••• Another famous pool involved the stock of the American Commercial Alcohol Company. During the summer of 1933, eight insiders and
their associates reaped a profit of $300,000 on an investment of $62,000. A third
pool, in a stock of the Fox Film Corporation, made $2,000,000 in five months. This
pool was notable for the extent to which large stockholders participated.
Perhaps the most famous of the short-swing speculators was Albert H. Wiggin, chairman
of the governing board of the Chase Manhattan Bank. His stock machinations, all of
the double-transaction abuse type, are partially chronicled in SEN. REP. No. 1455, supra,
at 62-63.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) (emphasis added). This point was stressed, apparently
unsuccessfully, in Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 843 (2d Cir. 1959).
44. There is an argument to the contrary that should be discussed. Perhaps Congress
was in fact concerned with abuse of inside information in a single transaction and
sought simply to make the transaction unprofitable by surrounding it with a period of
six months, both before and after the transaction, where any attempt at realizing a
profit would be futile. It is possible, for instance, that Congress was concerned with single
purchases tainted by information and therefore outlawed both a sale within the prior
six months (a section 16(b) "sale and purchase'') and a sale within the next six months
(a section 16(b) "purchase and sale''). This is the practical effect of regulating both
"purchase and sale" and "sale and purchase" situations. See Gratz v. Claughton, 187
F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951). As originally drafted, however,
section 16(b) dealt only with the "purchase and sale" situation. See Senate Hearings,
supra note 41, at 6557-58. The "sale and purchase" addition was made following a suggestion by Senator Bulkley that the statute as drafted would not deal with the possibility that "[a] man having a large amount of stock might know that his company was
going to pass a dividend, and then sell it with the intention of purchasing after the news
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the statutory provision for recovery, which provides that the profit
realized from a sale of shares is to be calculated with reference to the
price paid for their purchase.45 Such a scheme is appropriate if the
purchase and the sale are part of the same profit-making scheme, that
is, if the situation is one of double-transaction abuse. The mechanism
is less appropriate, however, for certain instances of single-transaction abuse. Assume, for example, that an insider, in a purchase free
of any possibility of abuse, buys stock at 85. The price rises to 100 because of generally favorable economic conditions. At this point the
insider becomes privy to advance information about a development
that will send the stock price tumbling to 50, so he sells at 100. The
recovery under section 16(b) would be 15 dollars per share, but advance information has allowed the insider to avert losses of 50 dollars
per share. Thus, the measure of damages is inadequate if the purpose
of the statute is to inhibit single-transaction abuses.
A similar analysis applies to the failure of the statute to reach
transactions occurring more than six months apart. In situations of
double-transaction abuse, where inside information motivates the initial transaction as well as the final one, the six-month time limit is
quite reasonable-the inside information typically relates to a temporary price fluctuation and is thus worthless if it cannot be turned
to profit ·within six months. For instance, an investor who receives information in January about a temporary price rise in February will
not buy in anticipation of the up-swing if he cannot sell and be assured of retaining his profits until July.48 Furthermore, a primary
function of the six-month limitation period is "to serve as an indicator of the existence of the prohibited short-swing intention. " 47 The
fact that an insider's purchase is quickly followed by a sale makes it
more reasonable to assume that the purchase was the beginning of a
short-swing based on advance information, rather than a legitimate
was out." Id. at 6558. Apparently, then, Congress did not add the "sale and purchase"
provision simply as a device to control single-transaction abuse with reference to the
purchase. The provision was enacted to deal with a type of double-transaction abuse
that had been overlooked.
45. "It is plain that [the profit provision] presupposes some matching of (I) purchases against sales, or of (2) sales against purchases ••• ," Gratz v. Claughton, 187
F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951). See also Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,
136 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). See generally 2 L. Loss,
supra note 6, at 1062-66; Cook & Feldman, supra note 2, at 385.
46. The dissipation of the usefulness of inside information is a recognized purpose
of the six-month limitation period. See Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S.
418, 442 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Comment, Section 16(b): An Alternative Approach to the Six-Month Limitation Period, 20 UCLA L. ru:v. 1289, 1299 (1973); Com•
ment, ll7 U. PA. L. REv. 1034, supra note 8, at 1054; Comment, Put and Call Options
under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 69 YALE L.J. 868, 876-77 (1960).
47. Comment, 20 UCLA L. Rl:v. 1289, supra note 46, at 1296; Comment, 69 YALE L.J.
868, mpra note 46, at 876-77.
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investment decision. In the context of single-transaction abuse, however, the six-month time limit is illogical. Since the defendant's first
transaction is, by hypothesis, completely innocent its only function
as a basis for liability is to start the six-month clock ticking. Though
the investor may later use inside information in deciding to make a
sale, he will not be liable under section 16(b) unless he has made a
fortuitous and unrelated purchase ·within the preceding six months.
Even more convincing is the statutory exemption for securities
"acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted.''48 If Congress was concerned about abuse of inside information with reference to the sale only in the "purchase and sale"
situation it would be absurd to create an exception for certain innocent purchases. Indeed, the "debt previously contracted" exemption
indicates that when a section 16(b) purchase presents no possibility
of abuse, the possibility of abuse with respect to a subsequent sale
should be irrelevant.49
It may be argued that Congress manifested an intent to deal with
single-transaction abuse when it expressly provided that the statute
should apply "irrespective of any intention on the part of" the insider
not to get out on a short-swing.60 This provision may be read to indicate that Congress wanted to eliminate any suggestion that some
connection in motivation beaveen the purchase and sale was necessary. In fact, the statutory provision cuts the other way. It removes
the question of intent from the facts to be considered because Congress feared that requiring the plaintiff to prove the defendant's
intent to sell or to disprove his intent not to sell would be too onerous.
Therefore, Congress sought to establish an irrebuttable presumption
that the avo transactions were linked in a single speculative plan.61
48. 15 u.s.c. § 78p(b) (1970).
49. One plausible argument from statutory language that Congress did intend to deal
with single-transaction abuse is that the preamble of section 16(b) speaks of a "purpose
of preventing the unfair use of [inside] information •.•." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
This language is broad enough to include single- as well as double-transaction abuse.
The preamble must, however, be interpreted in the light of the entire statutory scheme,
which, it is submitted, is clearly inconsistent with an intention to regulate singletransaction abuse. See, e.g., Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965): "As section 16(b) itself states, its general purpose is to preclude the 'unfair use of information which may have been obtained by' corporate
insiders, in trading in the securities of their corporation. But Congress did not seek to
accomplish the whole of this purpose by section 16(b) alone. Section 16(b) creates a
special remedy, applicable only in a limited situation."
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970): Profits shall be recoverable "irrespective of any intention
on the part of [the insider] in entering into such transaction of holding the security
purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months."
Cf. 2 L Loss, supra note 6, at 1060-61.
51. See Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 6557 (exchange between Senator Gore and
Thomas Corcoran, a principal draftsman of section 16(b) ):
Mr. CORCORAN• • • • You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell the security within 6 months after, because it will be absolutely
impossible to prove the existenc~ of such intention or expectation, and you have
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Despite the case law to the contrary, the terms of the statute and
its legislative history establish that section 16(b) is a limited measure
directed at "only the most prevalent form of the abuse of inside
information-trading designed to take quick profits from short-term
market fluctuations." 52
Of course, the unfair use of inside information even in only a
single transaction should not be encouraged. 63 Therefore, it could be
argued that if the statute is found to be unclear-despite the strong
arguments to the contrary-the courts should apply section 16(b) to
single-, as well as double-, transaction abuse. Certain single-transaction
abuses ·will be deterred even if the courts refuse to take this step.
Provable trading on inside information falls within the prohibitions
of both the common law54 and the general anti-fraud provisions of
to have this crude rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of
having to prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a
short-swing.
Senator GoRE. You infer intent from the fact.
Mr. CORCORAN. From the fact.
(Emphasis added).
52. See Hearings on H.R. 4341, H.R. 5065, and H.R. 5832 Before the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1255 (1942) (statement of
SEC Commissioner Ganson Purcell):
The Commission is, of course, aware that section 16(b) is only a partial deterrent
to breaches of trust by officers, directors, and principal stockholders. The potentialities of abuse of fiduciary obligations by these corporate insiders are infinite. No
complete catalog could ever be made of all the ways in which confidential corporate
information can be put to profitable use. It would be virtually impossible to draft
a statute which would define and prohibit all of the variations by which officers,
directors, or principal stockholders can profit from their trust. It seems to the
Commission that the Congress was eminently wise in seeking to deal with the
problem by exl'ressly prohibiting only the most prevalent form of the abuse of
inside information-trading designed to take quick profits from short-term market
fluctuations.
See also W. PAINTER, supra note 30, at 40; Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities EX·
change Act of 1934: An Alternative to "Burning Down the Barn in Order to Kill the
Rats", 52 CORNELL L.Q. 69, 74-75 (1966); Comment, Reliance Electric, Occidental
Petroleum, and Section l6(b): Interpretive Quandary over Mergers, 51 TEXAS L. REV,
89, 99 (1972); Comment, 20 UCLA L. R.Ev. 1289, supra note 46, at 1294-300; Comment,
117 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1034, supra note 8, at 1041 n.39; Casenote, 72 C0Lu11r. L. R.Ev.
1090, 1101 (1972); Casenote, 70 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1312, 1313 (1957). Contra, Casenote, 57
CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 287,289 (1957); Casenote, 45 VA. L. R.Ev. 1057, 1059 (1959).
53. It has been argued that trading on inside information may be justified on
economic grounds. See, e.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND TH.E'STOCK MARKET (1966);
Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 CoLUM,
LR.Ev. 260 (1968). Manne and Wu have touched off a lively debate. W. PAINTER, supra
note 30, at 42-45 (Supp. 1971). See, e.g., Ferber, The Case Against Insider Trading: A
Response to Professor Manne, 23 VAND. L. REV. 621 (1970); Schotland, Unsafe at Any
Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. R.Ev. 1425
(1967). To judge by the actions of the courts, however, "[I]t is no longer debatable that
trading on inside information merits universal condemnation." Schein v. Chasen, 478
F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1973) (Kaufman, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3333
(U.S., Dec. 3, 1973) (Nos. 73-439, 73-440, 73-495). See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), atfd. in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78,
248 N.E.2d 910 (1969).
54. The common law cause of action proceeds on the following principle:
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the Securities Exchange Act.55 The benefit gained by extending
section 16(b) would be the apprehension and presumed deterrence of
single-transaction abuse that would elude both these strictures, in
part because of difficulties in proving the existence of the requisite
actual abuse. 56 It should be realized, however, that only a small part
of this already limited universe could be affected by section 16(b).
Under the terms of the statute single-transaction abuse in a safe, for
instance, would be exempt unless a purchase not made in good faith
in connection with an antecedent debt had occurred within the previous six months. Because of the statutory damage provision, liability
would be further contingent on a rise in the price of the stock between the sale and the earlier purchase or, perhaps, on the payment
of dividends, 57 and would be limited to profits made as a result of the
rise or the dividends.
Extending section 16(b) to include the abuses falling within the
narrow limits described above would involve a considerable cost in
terms of equity. Because proof of actual abuse is not required by the
statute,58 recovery under section 16(b) is based on a presumption of
An agent who acquires confidential information in the course of his employment
• • • has a duty to account for any profits made by the use of such information,
although this does not harm the principle••.• So, if he has "inside" information
that the corporation is about to purchase or sell securities, or to declare or to pass
a dividend, profits made by him in stock transactions undertaken because of his
knowledge are held in constructive trust for the principal.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388, comment c (1957). See Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d
817 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S., Dec. 3, 1973) (Nos. 73-439,
73-440, 73-495); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d
910 (1969). Cf. Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139 (10th Cir. 1952). See also Comment, 51 TExAs
L. R.Ev. 89, supra note 52, at 100. For a thorough but dated comparison of liability
under section 16(b) and the common law, see Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors,
Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MICH. L. REv.
133, 139-52 (1939). Apparently liability runs to the corporation but may run directly
to an individual if an insider fails to disclose material inside information in his dealings
with that individual. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903). The
plaintiff, of course, must prove an actual misuse of inside information.
55. Perhaps of even greater importance than the common law developments is the ,
growth of rule lOb--5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1973), adopted pursuant to section l0(b)
of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). There is now little doubt that rule IOb--5
imposes upon the insider a duty to disclose material inside information before trading,
even where the trading is not a face-to-face transaction but is effected on a stock
exchange. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). The rule certainly covers officers and directors, see, e.g., List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965), and majority
or controlling shareholders, see, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 82829 (D. Del. 1951), but its application depends on proof of the actual culpability of the 1
insider. For a general treatment of rule lOb-5 as it relates to insider trading and nondisclosure of material inside information, including references to a wealth of commentary, see R. JENNINGS & H. MARsH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
1123-32 (3d ed. 1972).
56. See notes 54-55 supra.
57. See note 63 infra.
58. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
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abuse arising when an insider buys and sells at a profit within si.x
months. The soundn~ss of the presumption rests on the accuracy of
the statute's "crude rule of thumb,"59 that is, on the congruence
between the required facts and the implied fact. If the statute were
read to reach single-transaction abuse, the required facts would be
insufficient to justify the presumption of actual abuse. The occurence
of tw-o transactions within a short time-a fact that would otherwise
indicate double-transaction abuse-cannot justify the presumption
of guilt when the initial transaction is, by hypothesis, unrelated to the
later transaction. Essentially, then, abuse of inside information is
presumed merely on the basis of a single purchase or sale by an insider
where he has made a fortuitous and clearly innocent purchase at a
lower price at some time within the past six months. If such a presumption is sound, so is the presumption that every sale of an
issuer's stock by an insider represents an abuse of inside information if the stock sold for a lower price at some time during the preceding six months. If greater protection against single-transaction
abuse is necessary, it would be more just to enact a statute specifically
directed to that end, rather than to create a "suffocating dragnet" 00
out of a subsection enacted and designed for a limited and different
purpose. 61
An examination of the sorts of inquiries in which courts should
engage when applying the "possibility of abuse" test must therefore
keep in mind that the test properly refers only to the possibility of
double-transaction abuse. In determining whether a defendant should
be held liable, the courts must not focus on the "possibility of abuse"
inherent in any one transaction at issue. Rather, attention should be
directed at the circumstances surrounding both of the defendant's
transactions. 62
59. See note 51 supra.
60. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299, 305 (2d Cir.) (Hincks, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
61. Much of the commentary on section 16(b) agrees that single-transaction abuse
is better left outside the scope of the statute on policy grounds. See, e.g., Munter, supra
note 52, at 75 ("[W]hether we decide to reach the good and bad alike or to let them
both escape, the insider who is only in on one end should be treated no differently than
the insider who engages in only one transaction"); Comment, 20 UCLA L. REv. 1289,
supra note 46, at 1325-26; Comment, 117 U. PA. L. R.Ev, 1034, supra note 8, at 1041-42,
62, Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), illustrates the misperceptions of some
courts on this point. Several officers and directors of Atlantic Research Corporation
(ARC) received stock in Susquehanna Corporation (Susquehanna) pursuant to Susquehanna's merger acquisition of ARC. The defendants sold some of their Susquehanna
stock on the open market within six months of the merger. The issue was whether the
e.xchanges of shares pursuant to the merger were section 16(b) "purchases," The court
varied its treatment of the individual defendants, finding a purchase only by the one
defendant who "had knowledge [prior to the merger] of certain inside information
that would have helped him to predict the future performance of Susquehanna stock,"
486 F.2d at 352. This result is consistent with the premise that only the possibility of
double-transaction abuse should justify liability. One suspects, however, that the

January 1974]

Notes

609

Perhaps the first question a court should ask is whether the price
change63 that led to the defendant's profits could have been foreseen
when he made his initial transaction. If the price change was not
foreseeable,64 it could hardly have been the subject of inside information, and double-transaction abuse would be impossible. 65 The incourt's analysis is consistent with the double-transaction abuse premise only because
of the fortuity that the transaction in question was "the beginning transaction" rather
than "the closing or ending transaction." 486 F.2d at 349. The court states that the
pragmatic approach "requires ••. that the specific transaction itself, which constitutes
the unorthodox transaction, present the possibility of, or potential for, exploitation of
insider information.•.•• [I]f there is in the transaction itself, and the negotiations
leading up to it, an absence of such possibility of abuse •.• liability is not in order."
486 F.2d at 343 (emphasis original). If the merger exchange, then, was the closing
transaction, the court presumably would still have found liability if there ,vas a possible
misuse of inside information. But this would ignore the fundamental requirement of
potential double-transaction abuse-the possibility of abuse must pervade the initial
transaction as well as the final one, no matter which transaction is unorthodox.
63. Section 16(b) profits may also include dividends received by the insider. See, e.g.,
Abratns v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323 F. Supp. 570, 582-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Supp.
Opinion 1971), re-ud. on other grounds, 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971), afjd. fUb nom. Kern
County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973); Marquette Cement
Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Western Auto Supply Co. v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 743-44 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, '382 U.S. 987
(1966). The dividends are not recoverable, however, unless they are "inextricably connected with the 'purchase and sale' of stock and possible manipulation." Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1959). See also Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 528
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967): "[I')he ••. dividend was not part of a
scheme of short-swing speculation." Lamb, Adler, and Abrams suggest that recovery of
dividends is governed by something akin to the "possibility of abuse" test. The analysis
that this Note proposes with respect to recovery of profits based on a purchase-sale price
differential, therefore, may be congruently applied to "profits made" from dividends.
64. Useful information need not be directly foreseeable to the insider. Indeed, most
cases will reflect information available to the issuer's management (often the byproduct
of management decisions), which section 16(b) presumes is available to the defendant
"by reason of his relationship to the issuer." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). The plaintiff's
only burden is to show that the information was available to the issuer generally, that is,
that the events causing the price shift were foreseeable to the issuer. Of course, proof
that information was foreseeable to the defendant directly is also sufficient; furthermore,
it eliminates the need of proving that the defendant had access to information possessed
by others in the issuer's management. See text following note 76 infra. The only qualification in such cases is that the information must in some sense be "inside" information,
or information which the defendant receives because of his relationship with the issuer.
See note 91 infra and accompanying text.
65. Abuse would be impossible because inside information could not have motivated
the defendant's initial sale or purchase. However, the inquiry should not be phrased in
terms of the defendant's motivation, but merely in tertns of foreseeability. The defendant should not be allowed to avoid liability by showing plausible, innocent reasons
for trading as he did. The Supreme Court at least suggested the propriety of such
considerations in Kem County by observing:
Occidental wanted to avoid the position of a minority stockholder with a huge
investment in a company over which it had no control and in which it had not
chosen to invest. On the other hand, Tenneco did not want a potentially troublesome minority shareholder that had just been vanquished in a fight for the control
of Old Kern. Motivations like these do not smack of insider trading ••.•
411 U.S. at 601. This reasoning was used to support the Court's conclusion that an option
agreement between Tenneco and Occidental was not a section 16(b) "sale." See note 16
supra. Contra, Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 353 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
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quiry must focus on the actual cause of the price change. 00 While
foreseeability is easily assessed if the change is due to one specific
event, such as the announcement of a merger or the declaration of
unusually large dividends, more difficult cases will arise where a
price change is due to a variety of uncertain causes. Such cases may
pose theoretical dilemmas, but they should present few practical
problems, for even differences between the buying and the selling
price that are not caused by identifiable, specific events may often
be easily explained. The difference may, for instance, be due to an
over-all rise or fall in the stock market,67 or to the fact that the insider's purchase was a small block of shares and his sale includes his
entire holdings. Even if the causes cannot be isolated, practical
difficulties may be further resolved by placing the burden of proof
on the defendant. He can show (1) that no rational explanation for
the price differential exists,68 in which case he could not have relied
on relevant inside information when making his initial transaction;
or (2) that the total differential69 is the product of a specific event
that could not have been foreseen at the time he began his shortswing.70
Once it is established that the cause of at least part of the defendant's profits could have been the subject of inside information, the
court should tum to the question of whether the public at large had
access to the information.
400 U.S. 854 (1970): "That RKO's heart may have been pure and its motivation noble
matters not." To allow such a showing of motives might conflict with the explicit
statutory command not to consider the insider's intent to hold or to refrain from
repurchasing his securities for six months. See note 50 supra. Even if the statute's
terms are not conclusive, they do indicate reluctance to permit unreliable inquiries
into an investor's mental state.
66. This type of inquiry is already made in some cases using the pragmatic approach,
See, e.g., Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 353 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 854 (1970):
RKO had full knowledge of the proposed merger at the time it signed this contract.
Release thereafter of the proposed merger agreement to the public caused a predictable rise in the price of the securities of both airlines. RKO was in an ideal
position to take speculative advantage of this rise by purchasing Central securities
at a price established in the purchase agreement and disposing of these securities
after disclosure had caused them to increase in value.
(Emphasis added).
67. Cf. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (applying causation defense in section ll(e) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k{e) (1970) ).
68. More precisely, the defendant must show that the price differential was entirely
unexplainable or unforeseeable. If even part of it was the product of a foreseeable
cause the possibility of abuse cannot be completely excluded.
69. Cf. note 68 supra.
70. The burden of proof logically rests on the defendant because the plaintiff
establishes a prima fade case under section 16(b) simply by showing that an insider
has made a purchase and sale or sale and purchase within six months. The defendant,
in other words, is trying to escape liability under a statute that is applicable to him
on its face.
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Trading by officers, directors, and beneficial owners is regulated
under section 16(b) because of the possibility that insiders may be
using secret information to gain an unfair trading advantage. 71 However, if any relevant information that an insider may have prior to
beginning his short-swing is shared by the investing public, there is
no "possibility of abuse." 72 The defendant should be allowed to
demonstrate public access to the relevant information by proving (1)
that it is the sort of information that by its nature is generally available to the public, or (2) that it was adequately disclosed. The general
availability of the information that an attempted corporate takeover
may result in a defensive merger by the target corporation was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Kern County:
Perhaps Occidental anticipated that extending its offer would increase the likelihood of the ... occurrence of a defensive merger. But
again, the expectation of such benefits [that is, the higher prices resulting from the merger] was unrelated to the use of information unavailable to other stockholders or members of the public with sufficient funds and the intention to make the purchases Occidental had
offered to make ....1a
In Adler v. Klawans,74 the court stressed the fact that the relevant
information-that a distribution of dividends was forthcoming-had
been disclosed before the defendant became an insider: "At the time
of [defendant's] purchase it can reasonably be assumed that the
forthcoming dividend was a matter of public knowledge. [Defendant]
71. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
72. Cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (discussing regulation of insider trading under rule l0b-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-5 (1973) ):
[T]he Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal
access to material information • • . .
.
••. The only regulatory objective is that access to material information be
enjoyed equally, but this objective requires nothing more than the disclosure of
basic facts so that outsiders may draw upon their own evaluative expertise in reaching their own investment decisions with knowledge equal to that of the insiders.
73. 411 U.S. 582, 598 (1973). Another instance in which a profit is inherently foreseeable by the public as well as by insiders is a sale-of-control situation. A controlling shareholder may buy 100 shares at one price and sell the same shares for .a higher price within
six months if the sale includes all of his holdings. The higher price may, in effect, be a
premium for relinquishing control. The insider's information that this profit could be'
made would hardly be characterized as "secret." Similarly, news of an increase in military spending might prompt an officer of an arms manufacturing corporation to purchase his issuer's stock, but if the news was publicly distributed the officer should not
face section 16(b) liability if the increased spending makes his stock more valuable. See
, • Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954): "[A]ny
change in value due to the split or reclassification of stock comes substantially from the
actual or expected tastes and preferences of the public for particular types and forms of
securities ..•. [A]s to this type of market bonus, the insider has no more knowledge
than the rest of the world, and is not benefiting by the fruits"of inside speculation."
74. 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
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was in no different position with respect to this dividend from that
of any other member of the stock buying public."W
The defendant should prevail only where the public's informational resources are fully equal to his own. A profitable price change
II_!ay be foreseeable to both the public and the insider, but there is
still a "possibility of abuse" if the differential is seen as only a remote
possibility by the public but is seen as a virtual certainty by the insider. Therefore, the insider must take pains to ensure that any disclosure represents "the whole truth" and must refrain from trading
until outsiders are allowed a reasonable time to absorb the information. 76
Even where the public had no way of knowing of the relevant
information, there would be no possibility of abuse unless the particular defendant had access to it. The issue then becomes what kind of
proof by the defendant should be sufficient to establish that he had
no access. On first glance, it may appear that access can be conclusively
presumed from the fact that a defendant was an insider prior to his
initial transaction. However, Kern County77 and Gold v. Sloan 78 indicate that, when defendants are insiders but not part of the controlling management of their respective issuers, access cannot be
conclusively presumed. In Kern County, for example, the defendantofferor was technically an insider with respect to the target corporation before it made an extension of its tender offer, but the target's
75. 267 F.2d at 848. See also Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 354 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970): "RKO's success in fixing the purchase price
before the proposed merger became public knowledge opened the door to possible
speculative gains" (emphasis added). But see Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973),
discussed in notes 26 & 62 supra. Gold must be regarded as an anomaly because, although
it did not even discuss the disclosure issue with respect to defendant Sloan (who con•
ducted the merger negotiations), it noted with respect to defendant Scurlock (a dissident
director not involved in the merger negotiations) that:
[A] proxy statement had been prepared in connection with the merger. That proxy
statement gave complete information both on Susquehanna as it existed before
the merger and as it was expected to be after the merger. This was available to all
stockholders of the old ARC as well as to all stockholders of Susquehanna. After
all, it is the unfair use of inside information against which the statute is directed
and plainly where there has been full disclosure, as is given by a proxy statement,
the potential for unfairness and any basis for invoking the statute disappears,
486 F.2d at 349. Why the same disclosure did not exonerate all the defendants is not
explained. The incorporation of a disclosure element into the pragmatic test in Newmarl,
is criticized in Casenote, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1012, 1018-19 (1971). The commentator
argues that RKO only bought shares from those who knew about the proposed merger,
making public disclosure superfluous. This ignores the fact that section 16(b) does
not seek only to equalize information between a purchasing insider and those from
whom he buys; the broader purpose is to prevent the insider from making profits on
the basis of information unavailable to others. This purpose is served by regulating in•
sider trading whether or not those who trade with the insider are being duped.
76. Cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 n.18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1968).
77. A summary of the.facts and holding of Kern County is set out in note 16 supra,
78. 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973). See note 62 supra.
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management was hostile and very unlikely to provide the defendant
with inside information about the defensive merger that increased
the value of defendant's stock.79 The Court found that the defendant
had no access to inside information and that, therefore, there was
no possibility of abuse. Similarly, in Gold one defendant-director
was exonerated because "[H]e was simply a disaffected stockholder
and powerless director, tolerated but not welcomed by the management. . . . [H]e was as removed from the actual [merger]
negotiations between [the issuer and another corporation] and was
as much of an outsider looking on as was Occidental in Kern
County." 80 Two other officers were found not to have made section
16(b) purchases: "Both ... were in the lower management hierarchy.
Neither had the slightest connections with the merger negotiations
... and [they] were as ignorant of merger developments as any outside shareholder." 81
However, Kern County and Gold are highly questionable interpretations of the statute. The legislative history of section 16(b)
reveals no intention to separate the inquiry into access from the
question of insider status. Indeed, the hearings on the definition of
an "insider" emphasize Congress' concern that those placed in the
"insider" category normally be endowed with access to corporate
information.82 The congressional determination as to which investors
have access and which do not is embodied in the definition of "insider" and should be respected. Moreover, all insiders, including those
within noncontrolling groups, may enjoy some advantages over the
79. 411 U.S. at 598-99.
80. 486 F.2d at 344, 346.
81. 486 F.2d at 351.
Gold may be read as requiring not only access to, but actual possession of, insider
knowledge that could have encouraged speculation. The court stresses that defendant
"Scurlock possessed no knowledge that might have helped him speculate in Susquehanna's stock." 486 F.2d at 346 (emphasis added). It adds that "the only relevant
distinction to be made between Sloan and the other defendants in this case is that
Sloan possessed specific financial information ••• that would have helped him to predict
the future performance of Susquehanna stock ••••" 486 F.2d at 352 (emphasis added).
The court concludes that "[t]he actual knowledge possessed by an insider at the time
of a given 'unorthodox transaction' is an essential element to be considered in determining whether a 16(b) 'purchase' has occurred." 486 F.2d at 352-53. It must be remembered, however, that the court in Gold was making a conscious effort to adhere to
the doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court in Kern County: "[The issue] is ••• whether
the defendant 'had or was likely to have access to insider information, . • • so as to
afford it [or him] an opportunity to reap speculative, short-swing profits.'" 486 F.2d
at 343-44, quoting 411 U.S. at 596 (emphasis added). The Court in Kern County definitely
did not adopt a test based on actual possession of advance knowledge; it based its
holding on the hostile relationship between Occidental and Old Kem, which precluded
the possibility of an information swap. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. Perhaps the language in Gold was simply inadvertent overstatement; taken seriously, it
represents a misreading of the Supreme Court's approach in Kern County and a
departure from established doctrine. See Blau v. Max Factor &: Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307
n.6 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965).
82. See Senate Hearings, supra note 41, pt. 16, at 7741-42.
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ordinary shareholders. They are, at the very least, closer to corporate
decision-making and more likely to have advance information even
about policies they oppose.83 If the approach taken in Gold and Kern
County is followed by other courts, section 16(b) should at least be
held to raise a strong presumption that insiders have access to advance
information. 84 Perhaps rebuttal of the presumption should be allowed
only where the defendant can establish that he was regularly excluded
from access to the type of information at issue. Evidence that the
defendant had no access to the particular information involved in the
lawsuit is likely to be less reliable and more difficult for the plaintiff
to disprove.
Proof that the defendant, although an insider, did not have the
typical insider's access to information should be sufficient to rule out
possibility of abuse only in rare circumstances. However, proof that
the defendant was not an insider at all prior to his initial transaction
should be accepted more readily, for the presumption of access
arising from the fact of insider status would then be irrelevant. In
the case of those who later become officers and directors, however,
access to relevant information may exist even before insider status
is achieved.
Assume thal: investor Queen purchased shares in Chess Corporation on January 5. On March 5, she was placed on the Chess board,
and on April 5, she sells the shares at a profit. The prevailing judicial
view is that Queen would be held accountable under section 16(b),
although she was not an insider when she purchased. 85 This result
is often justified in terms of single-transaction abuse: Even though
Queen's purchase may have been innocent, her sale could have been
influenced by inside information.86 But single-transaction abuse
83. Even in Kern County, where Occidental was not on friendly terms with those
in control of Old Kern, see note 16 supra, the Court noted that Occidental was afforded
access to Old Kern's general ledger, consolidated financial statements, consolidated
journal entries, details of cash receipts from oil operations, supporting trial balances,
and other records. 411 U.S. at 587 n.12.
84. See, e.g., American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153, 1159 (S.D.N.Y,
1971):
We start from the statutory presumption, emphasized in Chemical Fund, Inc. v.
Xerox Corporation, 377 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967), that
"••• section 16 is specifically concerned with 'directors, officers and principal
stockholders,' and has adopted a rule that any stockholder owning more than
10 per cent of an equity security is presumed to be an insider who will receive
information regarding the company before it is made public."
Of course, the rule states only a [rebuttable] presumption ••••
85. See, e.g., Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702
(S.D.N.Y. i958).
86. See Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1958): "[A) purchaser of stock
need not have access to insider information in entering into his initial transaction. Having become an insider by virtue of having become a director, it [is the] defendant's subsequent speculation that is the 'vice within the purview of § 16(b).' " (Emphasis added),
See also Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, 357 (4th Cir. 1973) (Winter, J., dissenting in part);
note 38 supra and accompanying text.
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should be outside the scope of the section 16(b) prohibition.87 If
Queen is to be held accountable, it should not be in spite of what was
presumably an innocent purchase, but because the fact that she was
not an insider at the time does not necessarily mean that her purchase
was in fact innocent. Suppose, for instance, that Queen's profits resulted from a price rise caused by an announcement on March 15
of huge Chess dividends, which Queen had voted for and strenuously
advocated. There is at least the possibility that, on January 5, Queeri
knew that she would become a director and that she would soon be
able to sponsor an action, such as the declaration of high dividends,
that would allow her to reap short-swing profits.88 Such manipulation
clearly falls within the bounds of double-transaction abuse; Queen
had access to the relevant information on'January 5 because it concerned action that she herself would initiate. 89 This hypothetical case
87. See text accompanying notes 41-61 supra.
88. See, e.g., Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959). Defendant purchased
stock of Williams-McWilliams Industries, Inc., at various times between October 1,
1956, and January 17, 1957. He became a director on March 18, 1957, and by May 3,
1957, he had completely divested himself of his issuer's stock. "From the outset of his
term as director, commencing with the first meeting he attended-on the day he was
elected-he was active in pressing for the payment of dividends both in cash and in
stock." 267 F.2d at 843. Furthermore, he moved a resolution that the corporation
purchase a substantial amount of its own stock, which, of course, would help support
the market for the disposal of his own stock at a profit. 267 F.2d at 845-46.
89. Cf. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943): "It is naive to suppose that their knowledge of their own plans as officers
did not give them most valuable inside knowledge as to what would probably happen
to the stock in which they were dealing."
Many courts that have invoked the "possibility of abuse" test have relied heavily on
factors of "control" and "voluntariness" in judging whether a defendant has made a
purchase or sale. E.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S.
582, 599 (1973):
The critical fact is that the exchange took place and was required pursuant to a
merger between Old Kern and Tenneco. That merger was not engineered by
Occidental but was sought by Old Kern to frustrate the attempts of Occidental to
gain control of Old Kern. Occidental obviously did not participate in or control
the negotiations or the agreement between Old Kern and Tenneco.
Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 353 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.-854
(1970): "Because of its control of Frontier and consequent involvement in the merger
negotiations between Frontier and Central, RKO had full knowledge of the proposed
merger •••." See also Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, 344-46 (4th Cir. 1973); Ferraiolo v.
Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
The "control" factor must be placed in proper perspective-it is not important of
itself but only as it bears on the defendant's access to information. See Blau v. Lamb,
363 F.2d 507, 521 n.19 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967):
Even a noncontrolling "insider" has the power to misuse inside information for
speculative purposes by trading in light of the inside information to which he is
privy. A "controlling insider" also can manipulate corporate activity in order to
create favorable short-swing trading situations. But certain types of transactions
may not present any opportunity for the exercise of either "noncontrolling" or
"controlling" insider power to misuse inside information.
,
Where the defendant was not an insider prior to his initial transaction, a finding
that he controlled the event that caused his profits could be decisive in showing a
possibility of abuse, because it would establish the defendant's access to advance
information about the price change in spite of his lack of insider status. Such a finding
would not be vital to plaintiff's case where the defendant was an insider all along-
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indicates that, although it seems reasonable to presume a lack of
access from a lack of insider status, the presumption should not be
conclusive. 90 In order to rebut the presumption, however, the plaintiff should be required to demonstrate not only that the defendant
could have had access to the information, but also that access came
to him by virtue of his potential insider status, for the statute aims
to deter the abuse of only that information that the investor acquires
"by reason of his relationship to the issuer." 91
Similar problems exist with regard to investors who, prior to their
initial transaction, owned ten per cent or less of the issuer's stock and
thus were not insiders. Section 16(b) provides, however, that "[t]his
subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where
such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase
access to information would ordinarily be presumed. See text accompanying notes 82·84
supra. It is control over the price change that is important; whether the defendant's
transaction was voluntary or involuntary should make no difference since that docs not
bear on the question of access to inside information. Cf, Park &: Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte,
160 F.2d 984, 987-88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. '761 (1947).
90. Champion Home Builders Co. v. Jeffress, No. '73-1341 (6th Cir, Jan. 11, 1974)
(excerpted in 42 U.S.L.W. 23'78), revg. 352 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Mich. 19'73), illustrates
another situation where lack of access should not be conclusively presumed from lack
of insider status. Defendant Jeffress, the sole owner of Concord Mobile Homes, Inc.
(Concord), entered into an agreement with Champion Home Builders Co. (Champion)
whereby he would exchange all of his Concord stock in return for 13 per cent of
Champion's outstanding shares. The exchange made Jeffress a Champion insider;
furthermore, Jeffress became an officer and director of Champion after the exchange.
Suit was brought against Jeffress under section 16(b) after he sold some of his Champion
stock at a profit within six months of the exchange. Ordinarily it might be assumed
that no double-transaction abuse is possible in such situation; since Jeffress was not an
insider prior to his purchase he presumably did not know of the price rise in Champion
stock that was soon to take place. The court' correctly observed, however, that Champion
and Jeffress were on close terms before the purchase and that Jeffress "knew that the
two companies was [sic] going to make the price go up, or at least this is what [he]
thought would happen.'" No. '73-1341, slip op. at 10. Furthermore, Jeffress had participated in meetings of the Champion board even before he became an insider, 352 F. Supp.
at 1083-84, and he had had advance knowledge of the stock-split that occurred shortly
after his purchase and that helped to create a rising market for his shares. No, 73-1341,
slip op. at 10-11. Even if Jeffress did not create the price rise himself, therefore, his
close relationship with the issuer prior to his purchase justified a finding that he had
access to inside information, in spite of his lack of technical insider status.
91. The courts should not interpret this requirement too strictly. Consider, for
example, Champion Home Builders Co. v. Jeffress, No. '73-1341 (6th Cir. Jan. 11, 1974)
(excerpted in 42 U.S.L.W. 23'78), discussed in note 90 supra. The defendant received
the relevant inside information before he was technically an insider; arguably his
purchase breached no fiduciary duty to Champion, and he should not have been held
liable because the information was not acquired "by reason of his relationship to the
issuer.'' See Comment, Short-Swing Profits and the Ten Per Cent Rule, 9 STAN. L. ruw.
582, 585-88 (195'7). Surely, however, Jeffress would not have received information but
for the fact that he was soon to become an insider. Furthermore, it was his close
bargaining "relationship with the issuer" that allowed him access to the information.
In such situations, the purposes of the statute are better served by imposing liability,
even if this must be done through a fiction of "relation back" or "constructive" insider
status.
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and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved . . . . .''92
Since the exemption does not refer to officers and directors it raises a
strong negative implication that initial transactions by officers and
directors are not automatically excluded from the reach of the statute
simply because they were not insiders until after their first transaction.93 The justification for treating officers and directors differently
than shareholders of over ten per cent was explained in Adler v.
Klawans, 94 which held a director liable for purchases made before he
assumed his position:
Generally, although there are important exceptions in certain circumstances, officers and directors have more ready access to tp.e intimate business secrets of corporations and factors which can affect the
real and ultimately the market value of stock than does even so large
a stockholder as a "10% beneficial owner." ... Moreover, a director
or officer can usually stimulate more directly actions which affect
stock values and have knowledge of factors w:hich might depress
values. . . . Beyond doubt it was .considerations of this character
which led Congress to make a provision concerning 10% owners
which was not made ·with respect to officers and directors.95
The statute clearly indicates that proof that a defendant ,was not
an owner of over ten per cent of the stock either before or after a
transaction should remove that transaction from the reach of the
statute. However, it leaves unclear whether the transaction that
brings a defendant'~ holdings to over ten per cent should fall within
the exemption.96 Assume that an investor purchases nine per cent
of a corporation's stock on January 5 and another two per cent on
January IO. He sells the entire eleven per cent ·within six months.
The statute clearly exempts the January 5 purchase, for the investor
was not a beneficial owner of more than ten per cent "at the time of"
that transaction. The prevailing view is that section 16(b) does embrace the January 10 transaction, which put the investor over the ten
per cent line.97 This view would liberally construe the statutory
92. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
93. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 {2d Cir. 1959). The court relied heavily on the
statutory proviso for beneficial owners of over ten per cent in reaching its conclusion:
"Under the familiar canon of construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius ["to
include one is to exclude the other'1, the presence of this emphatic and unmistakable
clause in the portion governing the one class demonstrates a clear legislative intent that
no such provision applies to the other.'' 267 F.2d at 845.
·
94. 267 F.2d 840 {2d Cir. 1959).
95. 267 F.2d at 845.
96. See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918, 923 (8th Cir. 1970),
affd. on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
97. See, e.g., Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970),
affd. on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104
F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Newmark v. RKO General, Inc. 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970) (dictum). Contra, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. W.R.
Stephens Inv. Co,, 141 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
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language, "at the time of [the purchase]" to mean "simultaneous
with" or "immediately after," rather than "immediately prior to."
Thus, section 16(b) would cover the January IO purchase because the
defendant became an eleven per cent beneficial owner "simultaneous
with" his purchase.
This result has been justified on the grounds of the possibility of
single-transaction abuse. 08 As in the case of officers and directors, 00
this rationale is insufficient. A justification in terms of possible
double-transaction abuse also appears inadequate. It may be argued,
as it was with regard to directors and officers,100 that, even where the
investor is not an insider before his initial transaction, an opportunity
for manipulation is present if he becomes an insider later; thus, the
investor who becomes a large stockholder can misuse his position in
such a way that he will be able to reap profits even from the transaction that first made him an insider.101 Such manipulation would
in fact be double-transaction abuse. The investor would have had
access to relevant information when he made his initial transaction,
because he himself planned to cause the price change that would
lead to his subsequent profits. To return to the investor who makes
a nine per cent purchase, followed by a two per cent purchase, followed within six months by a sale of the entire eleven per cent, it
could be argued that the exemption was designed to exclude liability
for the nine per cent purchase, because such a purchase would not,
in itself, give the investor the ten per cent plus ownership that presumably indicates power to manipulate. The two per cent purchase
would be within the reach of the statute, however, because it would
create insider status and the power to manipulate. On its surface,
this argument seems consistent with the statute's clear exemption of
the nine per cent purchase and with the exemption's function of
ensuring that liability is imposed only on those investors who have
the power to manipulate.102 The fallacy of the argument can be shown
in its distinction between the nine per cent purchase and the two
per. cent purchase. The exclusion of the nine per cent purchase cannot
98. See, e.g., Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 400
U.S. 854 (1970), quoted in text accompanying note 40 supra.
99. See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
100. See notes 88-89 supra and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918, 924 (8th Cir.
1970), affd. on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972):
illustrative of some of the mischief that would be permitted in spite of Congress' action in enacting 16(b) [if there were no liability for the very transaction
that makes one an insider] is an initial purchase of as large a block of stock as 51
percent or more of a corporation's stock, followed by a sale anytime within six
months by the stockholder who obviously within that period could obtain much
inside information and also could influence, manipulate or control corporate trans•
actions.
(Emphasis added).
102. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
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be justified on the grounds that it is not followed by insider status and
power to manipulate. The investor could be planning to buy more
stock and manipulate the price as easily at this early stage as later.
Indeed, where the investor actually makes the subsequent purchases
that bring him insider status~the only situation to which the exemption applies, since othenvise the investor's purchases are clearly not
covered by the statute-there is a possibility that an intent to manipulate actually existed at the time of the nine per cent purchase. In
this situation, therefore, the reason that the nine per cent purchase
is exempt is not because it is not followed by the power to manipulate.
Rather, it is exempt in spite of the fact that it is followed by the
power to manipulate. Since any power to manipulate that might
arise from the two per cent purchase could also have motivated the
nine per cent purchase, there is no reason to exempt the latter, as
the statutory provision does; without exempting the former as well.
At the root of the statutory exemption, in other words, is the determination that even investors who are about to acquire more than ten
per cent of their issuer's 'stock do not have the degree of power to
manipul~te possessed by investors on the verge of becoming officers
and directors.103 Recovery should, therefore, be restricted to profits
made from two transactions that are both initiated after the investor
becomes an owner of over ten per cent, when he has full access to all
corporate information, rather than just access to information about
price changes flowing from his own future power to manipulate.104
Even if courts continue to impose liability on transactions that
make the investor an owner of over ten per cent of the issuer's stock,
such liability should not be imposed automatically. Because of the
limited kind of access available to a defendant who has not been an
insider in the past, this liberal interpretation should, at most, allow
the introduction of evidence that the defendant in fact had access to
inside information prior to his purchase.
No matter how the proviso is interpreted, however, evidence
should be allowed that would establish that the investor's purch~e
has merely restored him to insider status.105 In this way, the exemp103. This conclusion agrees with the judicial explanation of the dichotomy in the
statutory exemption. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
104. Most of the commentary is in agreement. See, e.g., W. PAINTER, supra note 30,
at 40-42; Munter, supra note 52, at 74-75; Comment, 9 STAN. L. REv. 582, supra note 91,
at 586-88; Comment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1034, supra note 8, at 1041 n.39; Casenote, 72
CoLUM. L. REv. 1090, supra note 52, at 1101; Casenote, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1312, supra
note 52, at 1313. Contra, 2 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1061; Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act (pt. 2), 66 HARv. L. REv. 612, 631-32 (1953).
105. The "at the time of'' language in the proviso could be construed as meaning
"prior to" in all cases except those involving a repurchase, where the construction
would be "simultaneous with." Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918,
922-23 (8th Cir. 1970), affd. on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972) (dictum). See Comment, 9 STAN. L. REv. 582, supra note 91, at 588 n.33; Casenote, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1312,
supra note 52, at 1313.

620

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:592

tion would not allow an investor "to purchase a large block of stock,
sell it out until his ownership [is] reduced to less than 10%, and then
repeat the process, ad infinitum. " 106
The inquiries described above can be separated, so that the "possibility of abuse" test takes two forms. In a limited sense, it would
inquire only whether a given unorthodox transaction destroys the
defendant's continuity of investment. A broader interpretation of the
test would include an examination of the cause of the price change
that led to the defendant's profits, the public's access to the relevant
information, and the access of the particular defendant. The dichotomy between a broad and a narrow interpretation of "possibility of
abuse" is not merely theoretical. The early cases among those that
have been grouped together under the broad rubric of the "possibility of abuse" approach addressed only the task of defining
"purchase" and "sale" and limited their inquiry to continuity of
investment. Later cases expanded both the use to which the test was
put and the scope of the inquiry. Finally, the Supreme C:ourt, in
Kern County, adopted the questionable approach of applying a broad
"possibility of abuse" test to the narrow purpose of defining "purchase" and "sale."107
The approach of the Sixth Circuit in Ferraiolo v. Newman 108
illustrates the first stage in this development. The question before
the court was whether a director's conversion of preferred stock into
common stock under threat of a redemption call was a "purchase"
under section 16(b). Although the court noted that the defendant
appeared to be "a very inactive director"100 and that "he was not in
fact privy to any inside information concerning the company,"110 it
said that "[s]uch considerations . . . are entirely irrelevant to the
applicability of section 16(b)."111 Instead, the court rested its holding
that the conversion was not a "purchase" on the fact that "[o]nce the
market price of the common stock rose above the redemption price
of the preferred, the preferred, . with its undilutable conversion
privilege, became, in the objective judgment of the market place, the
economic equivalent of the common."112 Ferraiolo was typical of the
early cases113 that endorsed the pragmatic approach in that it decided
106. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957, 959 (S.D,N.Y. 1952), See
note 34 supra and accompanying text.
107. See text accompanying note 125 infra.
108. 259 F.2d 342 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
109. 259 F.2d at 344.
110. 259 F.2d at 344.
111. 259 F.2d at 344. Compare Ferraiolo with Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, 344-50
(4th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying notes 80-81 supra.
112. 259 F.2d at 345.
113. See, e.g., Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1006 (1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967):

January 1974]

Notes

621

the "purchase" and "sale" issue on the narrow ground of continuity
of investment but used broader language that spoke of a possibility
of abuse: "Every transaction which can reasonably be defined as a
purchase will be so defined, if the transaction is of a kind which can
possibly lend itself to the speculation encompassed by Section
16(b)."114 Even this language focuses on the "kind" of the particular
transaction, rather than on broader questions, such as access. The
court's broad language, however, provided a handle for the extension
of the pragmatic approach in later cases.
In Blau v. Lamb,115 a 1966 decision by the Second Circuit, the
language used by the court went far beyond Ferraiolo, although the
decision was based on the same narrow ground. As in Ferraiolo, the
court decided that a conversion of preferred stock into common stock
was not within the terms of section 16(b) because the common stock
was the "economic equivalent" of the preferred.116 The court justified
its use of the pragmatic approach by stating that the "underlying
purpose [of the statute] provides no reason for the application of
Section l 6(b) to a transaction that poses no danger whatever of insider
abuse."117 The rule expressed in Blau v. Lamb, in other words, was
cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex ("the reason of the law ceasing,
the law itself also ceases").118
The first important extension of the pragmatic approach that
went beyond mere language was made by the Second Circuit in Newmark v. RKO General, Inc.,11 9 where the court not only looked at
noneconomic factors, but also used the "possibility of abuse" test to
·decide a more fundamental issue than whether a given transaction
was "purchase" or "sale." The case involved a purchase and subsequent exchange of shares pursuant to merger.120 The court ad-

a

Blau v. Max Factor &: Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965);
Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954); Blau v. Mission
Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 1016 (1954).
114. 259 F.2d at 345. Accord, Kem County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
411 U.S. 582, 612-13 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
·
115. 363 F.2d 507 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
116. 363 F.2d at 521-23.
117. 363 F.2d at 519.
118. 363 F.2d at 519.
119. 425 F.2d 348, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
120. Newmark was one of the first appellate court cases to apply the pragmatic approach to an exchange of shares pursuant to a merger. Earlier unorthodox transaction
cases dealt almost exclusively with stock conversions and reclassifications. The conversion problem was largely eliminated in 1966, when the SEC promulgated rule 16b-9,
17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9 (1973), exempting most conversions from the reach of the section.
Recent cases, perhaps for this reason, have centered around the merger-exchange problem. See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973);
Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973); American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co. 346
F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The change in the type of "unorthodox" transactions to
be brought before the appellate courts has no doubt contributed to the expansion of
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dressed itself first to what it termed the "threshold issue" of whether
the defendant's transactions lent themselves to "the type of speculative abuse which section 16(b) was designed to prevent."1i2 1 In dealing
with this issue the court focused on the fact that the defendant
purchased the shares in question before news of the merger had
been publicly disclosed rather than on the break in the continuity of
investment represented by the merger exchange. Significantly, the
court discussed the issue of whether the merger exchange was a "sale"
separately and only after it had decided that the two transactions
indicated a possibility of abuse. The definitional point was then
quickly settled by noting that, since the defendant had acquired the
securities of a different company, the "economic equivalence" doctrine did not apply.122 Newmark, in other words, did not use "possibility of abuse" as a touchstone for defining "purchase" and "sale,"
but as a general indicator of when it is just to apply the statute and
when it is not. 123
After Newmark, the courts continued to expand their inquiry
into the noneconomic aspects of the pragmatic approach. For instance,
Kern County and Gold v. Sloan both found that there was no possibility of abuse where the defendant was a noncontrolling insider who
had no access to inside information.124 Kern County, however, applied
Newmark's broad "possibility of abuse" test not as a threshold inquiry but as a touchstone for deciding the more narrow issue of
whether a given transaction is a "purchase" or "sale." In so doing,
the Court limited the use of the "possibility of abuse" test to cases
where the existence of a "purchase" or a "sale" is at issue-that is,
to cases of "unorthodox transactions."126 In other words, the Court's
decision did not go as far as Newmark in that it refused to look into
"possibility of abuse" as a "threshold issue," but went beyond Newmark in that it considered the particular defendant's access to the relevant corporate information.
The "possibility of abuse" test, in the broad sense in which Kern
County rised it, is inappropriate for the purpose of defining whether
a transaction is a "purchase" or "sale." The Kern County approach
the pragmatic approach to include such inquiries as the existence of access to informa•
tion, because cases involving conversions could easily be disposed of on "continuity of
investment" grounds. Cases involving merger exchanges, however, could not be decided
on this ground; broader inquiries were therefore developed to deal with those cases in
which courts did not want to impose liability.
121. 425 F.2d at 353.
122. 425 F.2d at 354.
123. The Newmark approach was followed in the initial opinion in American Stan•
dard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See note 130 infra.
124. See text accompanying note 79 supra (Kern County); text accompanying notes
80-81 supra (Gold).
125. 411 U.S. at 593-95.
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creates a completely arbitrary distinction between "orthodox" and
"unorthodox" transactions. The investor who trades on a strict stockfor-cash basis faces section 16(b) liability irrespective of "possibility
of abuse": "It is true enough that, in the case of a garden-variety
purchase and sale or sale and purchase within six months ... it would
be no defense that a person within its terms was operating, by sheer
intuition, from Antarctica or even from outer space."126 I£ the same
individual options away his shares, however, he ~as made an "unorthodox transaction," and the courts will consider such matters as
disclosure and his lack of access to inside information. I£ the defendant is to be relieved of liability because he could not have abused his
insider status, he should be relieved whether he has traded his securities for other securities pursuant to a merger or simply sold them for
cash.
This dichotomy heaven orthodox and unorthodox transactions
is also irrational because such matters as disclosure and lack of acces·s
are completely unrelated to the economic function of the defendant's
transactions. The only relevant distinction between orthodox and
unorthodox transactions as "purchases" or "sales" lies in the discontinuity of investment that always characterizes the former and may
·or may not characterize the latter.127 The illogic of introducing other
considerations is illustrated by Gold v. Sloan, one of the first of the
progeny of Kern County. Gold refused to hold two officers of the
Susquehanna Corporation liable under section 16(b) even though
they obtained Susquehanna shares pursuant to a merger exchange
and sold them for cash within six months. The court specifically
based its finding that the two officers had not made "purchases" under
the statute on the fact that "[b]oth [officers] were in the lower management hierarchy. Neither had the slightest connection with the merger
negotiations ... and [both] ·were as ignorant of merger developments
as any outside stockholder. " 128 Furthermore, the court found that the
status of one of the defendants as an officer was "merely titular";
another insider who had conducted exactly the same transactions but
who was: more involved in the affairs of the corporation was found
126. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1971), afjd.

sub 110m. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
See also Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 1973); American Standard, Inc. v.
Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153, 1167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Supp. Op. 1972).
127. The idea that unorthodox transactions are perhaps more likely to be "involuntary" can hardly justify the preferential treatment of those who make them. Not only
are many unorthodox transactions voluntary (the grant of an option, for example), but
involuntary stock-for-cash trades may easily be imagined. Cf. Western Auto Supply Co.
v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 742 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. de11ied, 382 U.S. 987
(1966) (defendant claimed sale was motivated by pendency of antitrust litigation). See
also note 89 supra.
128. 486 F.2d at 351.
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to have made a "purchase."129 This logical inconsistency could be
resolved by treating all the investors as having made purchases, but
exempting the "ignorant" directors and officers because their trading
was innocent in light of the broad possibility of abuse test. 130
If the test for determining whether a transaction is a "purchase"
or "sale" is limited to an examination of continuity of investment,
the question remains: Is there a role to be played by the broader
"possibility of abuse" test? It could be argued that in the light of the
objective, all-encompassing language of section 16(b) the only function for the pragmatic approach is as a tool of statutory construction
in ambiguous cases. When all elements of the statute are satisfied, as
they are where all transactions are "purchases" or "sales" under the
"continuity of investment" standard, liability must automatically
ensue. This argument has force, but it is not decisive. Although the
statutory language is broad enough to reach all situations where
abuse is possible,131 there is no reason to extend it to cover any
129. 486 F.2d at 351-53.
130. Another illustration of the analytical difficulties presented by the Kem County
approach is found in the two opinions of Judge Lasker in American Standard, Inc, v.
Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 346 F. Supp. at 1165 (Supp. Op. 1972),
Crane Co. had purchased 32 per cent of the stock of Air Brake Co. by the end of May
1968. Crane exchanged its Air Brake stock for American Standard stock between June
7 and June 13, 1968, pursuant to a merger between Air Brake and American Standard,
Finally, on June 13, 1968, and shortly thereafter, Crane sold its American Standard
stock for cash on the open market. Suit was brought under section 16(b), alleging that
Crane had "sold" its Air Brake stock when it exchanged it for American Standard stock,
The court granted the plaintiff summary judgment in its 1971 opinion, following the
Newmark analysis by discussing "opportunities for speculative abuse" as a threshold inquiry independent of its decision that Crane's exchange was a 16(b) "sale." Further•
more, after deciding there was a possibility of abuse, the court decided the "sale" issue
simply by citing Newmark and Blau v. Lamb to the effect that the exchange of securities of one company for the securities of a different company does not satisfy the
"economic equivalence" doctrine. 346 F. Supp. at 1161.
On the day after the court's opinion was issued, the Second Circuit decided Abrams
v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157 (1971), affd. sub nom. Kern County Land
Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973), using the approach that was
later adopted by the Supreme Court in Kern County. Judge Lasker withdrew his opinion to permit consideration of the impact of Abrams on the American Standard litigation. Interestingly, Judge Lasker also decided for plaintiff in his supplemental opinion,
but the reasoning was tortured because of a justifiable effort to fit the earlier holding
into the Abrams framework. The Abrams rationale, in the context of the factual similarity of the Abrams and the American Standard situations, forced the court to realize
that its finding of a possibility of abuse might well be open to question. Thus, accord·
ing to Abrams, the merger exchange was not a sale. But, the court concluded, Abrams
need not compel a different result because it declared that possibility of abuse was irrelevant where stock was traded for cash. This allowed the court to impose liability, not
on the theory that Crane's merger exchange of Air Brake stock for Standard stock was a
"sale" of Air Brake stock, but on the hitherto virtually ignored theory that the ultimate
cash sale of Standard stock could be considered a section 16(b) sale of the Air Brake
stock. In effect, the Abrams analysis forced the court to reach the Alice-in-Wonderland
conclusion that a sale of Standard stock is the same as a sale of Air Brake stock, in spite
of the earlier conclusion that there was no economic equivalence between the two secU•
rities.
131. Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F,2d 348, 351 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
854 (1970).
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situation-whether or not it involves an "unorthodox" transactionwhere abuse is impossible: "Congress adopted the sweeping, arbitrary
regulatory mechanism embodied in Section 16(b) in order to insure
that even the possibility of insider abuse was deterred, but it would
seem to follow that in order to avoid 'purposeless harshness' a court
should first inquire whether a given transaction could possibly tend
to accomplish the practices Section 16(b) was designed to prevent."182
In other words, the maxim cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex,138
should apply.
Specific authorization for the use of the "possibility of abuse" test
in all cases can be found in the statute's preamble, which states the
statutory policy to be "preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by an insider by reason of his relationship
to the issuer."134 As one commentator has noted, "[t]he provisions
which follow this preamble are clearly intended to be operative only
insofar as they promote this policy; to apply those provisions where
this purpose is not being furthered [that is, where there is.no possibility of abuse] is to go beyond the expressed design of the statute."185
Furthermore, the use of the broad "possibility of abuse" test in
cases involving orthodox transactions is not barred by the express
statutory limitations on the ~cope of the court's inquiry, for the
broad test considers neither the· insider's intent nor the actual existence of abuse. 136
More importantly, the policies that motivate the current broad
inquiry into possibility of abuse in cases involving a purchase-sale
question are also relevant in cases involving only orthodox transactions, suggesting that the "possibility of abuse" requirement is
appropriate in all cases arising under section 16(b). Significantly, the
"possibility of abuse" test did not develop simply as a tool of construction to resolve ambiguities in the statutory definitions of "purchase"
and "sale." Rather, the test was intended to ameliorate what the
courts saw as the "purposeless harshness"137 of a wide-ranging but
heavy-handed statute.138 For instance, the Second Circuit, in Blau v.
Lamb,139 speaks of the "arbitrary, some might say Draconian,"140
132• .Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507,519 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967),
133. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
·
134. 15 u.s.c. § 78p(b) (1970).
135. Comment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1034, supra note 8, at 104-4.
136. See, e.g., Petteys v• .Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir, 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1006 (1967):
Since the purposes of the Act are stated clearly and appear side-by-side with the
literal demands, we do not believe we have been precluded by Congress from pursuing an equitable and historic role by examining the facts of each case in the
light of the stated goals to determine on an ad hoc basis whether the purposes of
the Act are in any way being served by an application of the literal provisions.
137. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
138, Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir:), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
139. 363 F.2d 507 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
140. 363 F.2d at 515.
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nature of section I6(b) and remarks that "[i]t might be said that
Congress decided in order to throw out the bathwater that the baby
had to go, too."141 Another court has stated that in the case before it,
the "crude rule of thumb" created by the statute would become the
"extremely crude rule of a most deformed and misshapen thumb." 142
The potential harshness of section 16(b)143 flows from the statute's
refusal to consider actual innocence or guilt; the insider is presumed
to have abused inside information simply by virtue of his profitable
transactions and their proximity in time.144 The presumption is as
likely to lead to unduly harsh results in cases involving orthodox
transactions as it is in cases involving unorthodox transactions. Thus,
it is inconsistent to look to the possibility of abuse in one group of
cases and not in the other.145 Still, the arguments for restricting the
scope and the use of the "possibility of abuse" test must not be understated. Even as limited by Kern County, the test has given birth to
much litigation and confusion. To some extent, the charge that the
courts have created a muddled test that destroys the deterrent function of section 16(b) is justified.146 It is worth asking, however, whe141. 363 F.2d at 515.
142. Provident Securities Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 787, 792 (N.D,
Cal. 1971).
. 143. Professor Loss has termed section 16(b) "the most cordially disliked provision"
of all of the disclosure-related requirements. 2 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1087,
144. Were this stern conclusive presumption not tempered by an inquiry into such
matteJS as disclosure and lack of access, it is even possible that a constitutional due
process challenge could be launched against section 16(b). Section 16(b) has been ex•
plicitly upheld against such a challenge on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Gratz v,
Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49-50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Park &: Tilford,
Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Smolowc v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239-40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). However,
a new appraisal is warranted in the light of such cases as Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441
(1973), holding that a permanent and irrebuttable statutory presumption of nonrcsi•
dency (for university tuition purposes) is invalid where the presumption is arbitrary,
where it is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and where alternate means of determination are available. 412 U.S. at 448, 451-52. Even in the absence of constitutional
problems, however, the potential harshness of section 16(b) is serious enough to justify
an extension rather than a restriction of the "possibility of abuse" test.
145. The harshness of section 16(b) is not sufficiently mitigated by the power of the
Securities and Exchange Commission to exempt "any transaction or transactions • • •
not comprehended within the purpose of [theJ subsection." 15 U.S.C, § 78p(b) (1970).
The courts have already recognized that administrative action is inadequate and that
the wiser policy is to create flexible judicial doctrines for applying the statute:
.•. the primary duty of administering § 16(b), unlike other provisions of the [Ex•
change] Act, is not imposed upon the Commission, but upon the courts through the
medium of stockholder suits. Moreover, the Commission has been slow to exercise
its power of exemption. In these circumstances, whether § 16(b) is to have a flexible
or mechanistic application in practice must depend upon the courts.
Blau v. Max Factor &: Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307 n.5 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892
(1965). See Comment 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1034, supra note 8, at 1044.
146. Courts have, in the past, expressed a strong disinclination to adopt "black-letter
rubrics" in dealing with section 16(b) problems. See, e.g., Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F,2d
342, 344 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959); Roberts v, Eaton, 212 F.2d 82,
85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348, U.S. 827 (1954). It is this sentiment, perhaps coupled with
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ther the litigation surrounding the "possibility of abuse" standard is
due to the inherent weakness of the test or to the failure of courts to
enunciate the factors that should guide its application.
uncertainties about statutory purpose, that has led courts to avoid a clear enunciation
of the elements required for a showing of "possibility of abuse." The lack of such an
enunciation, however, is surely at the root of much of the aiticism of the pragmatic approach. Witness Justice Douglas' reaction to the majority holding in Kern County:
Thus, the courts will be caught up in an ad hoc analysis of each transaction, determining both from the economics of the transaction and the modus operandi of the
insider whether there exists the possibility of speculative abuse of inside information. Instead of a section that is easy to administer and by its clearcut terms discourages litigation, we have instead a section that fosters litigation ••.•
411 U.S. at 612 (dissenting opinion).
Certainly Justice Douglas is correct in emphasizing the need far predictability in the
application of section 16(b). The statute functions primarily as a deterrent, not as a
compensatory remedy. This is brought out by the statute's statement of p~rpose ("Far
the purpose of preventing ••.•") and legislative history, as well as by the fact that recovery goes to the issuer, which has arguably not been harmed by insider trading in its
shares. Thus, as one court has noted, the principal effect of section 16(b) has been, to
place the "responsibility for meticulous observance of the provision upon the shoulders
of the insider." 13ershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 992 (1971). Accord, Popkin v. Dingman, 366 F. Supp. 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
It is unreasonable ta place the burden of "meticulous observance" of a statute on an investor without also providing a relatively certain standard against which his dealings
may be measured. Furthermore, section 16(b) should be predictable far a number of
economic reasons._Any benefit derived from regulation of trading has the corresponding
cost of disturbing market equilibrium by introducing noneconomic factors, such as the
possibility of civil liability, into the investor's calculus. Institutionalization of a noneconomic consideration is justified only by benefits flowing from the application of the regulation. Where a regulation is uncertain in its application, however, an investor may
avoid an investment on the erroneous assumption that the statute prohibits it. This is
an intrusion of noneconomic factors into the market situation, a theoretical cost, without the corresponding benefit of deterring prohibited conduct. There is no benefit because the investment that was "deterred" was not prohibited and presumably not undesirable.
·
An uncertain statute in the securities context also contributes to an imperfect allocation of resources since fear of potential liability may deter investment in some profitable
enterprises which, by hypothesis, either are relatively efficient compared with other
firms in their industry or are in a sector of the economy which can effectively utilize
additional resources. However, the attempt to introduce predictability into the application of section 16(b) need not produce an unyielding, harsh statutory application, as
some writers have suggested. See, e.g., 2 L. Loss, supra note 6, at 1089-90: "[I]t would
be illusory to pretend that one could ever have both equity and relative automaticity."
A compromise may be struck by utilizing a flexible standard composed of easily determined, fairly objective inquiries such as has been proposed here.

